MBS is a Man in a Hurry Seeking Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Reactors – GWC Mag

• What would be the US role in supplying it and controlling their use?

MBS is a Man in a Hurry Seeking Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Reactors

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salma (MBS) is a man in a hurry to seek a trifecta of an the end of the Gaza war, an Israeli commitment to Palestine statehood, and, in parallel, a US defense pact, along with crucial help for the Saudi nuclear program including uranium enrichment. This is not a horse race he can afford to lose.

While PM Netanyahu is in power, Palestinian statehood is a nonstarter which is why Saudi Arabia might uncouple this element of its plans and focus on the defense pact and nuclear energy.  Image: Bing AI

According to this Reuters wire service report, the Saudi government seeks to complete an agreement with the US for a defense pact, and support for uranium enrichment before the end of 2024 and preferably, before the November election. The reason is the Democrats control the Senate, for now, and this may change in the election. Time is running out for them and for President Biden to secure some or all of these results as key accomplishments of his administration.

It follows that the Saudi government may also seek to complete a deal for US support for its commercial nuclear energy program in the same time frame. The Saudi energy ministry accepted best and final offers from four bidders in December 2023 – China, France, South Korea, and Russia. Westinghouse was not invited to bid because there is no 123 agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia. That could change. Up to now the Saudi pace for handling its tender for two 1400 MW PWRs has been a slow walk in the park. Several converging factors may speed things up.

Saudi Arabia’s Quest for US Support for its Uranium Enrichment Program

Implicit in Saudi Arabia’s ambitions is US support for development of a capability to enrich uranium, in part to supply its  planned fleet of nuclear reactors and, also, as a clear deterrent signal to Iran.

It isn’t clear what kind of controls / guarantees would need to be in place that would satisfy US concerns, especially in Congress,  over potential development of enrichment levels beyond commercial grades (3-5% U235). Without endorsing any specific arrangement, here are some speculative thoughts about how some moving pieces might plausibly fit together. US direct operations and controls for Saudi uranium enrichment plant would be needed as part of any deal.

Here’s one way that might happen. For instance, and this is conjecture, the US government has been funding the development of the American Centrifuge Project, owned and operated by Centrus (NYSE:LEU), with a DOE contract awarded to produce special nuclear fuel for advanced nuclear reactors (high assay low enriched uranium)(HALEU) fuel at 6-15% U235.  The firm began production of HALEU in October 2023.

Centrus has emphasized in it press statements about the project, as far back as September 2023, that with sufficient funding and offtake commitments, the firm could significantly expand production of HALEU or perhaps also lower levers of enrichment, 3-5% U235, for commercial light water reactors.

According to Centrus, a full-scale HALEU cascade, consisting of 120 centrifuge machines, with a combined capacity to produce approximately 6,000 kilograms of HALEU per year (6 MTU/year), could be brought online within about 42 months of securing the necessary funding.

Centrus said it could add an additional HALEU cascade every six months after that milestone was achieved. It would mobilize hundreds of union workers in Ohio to build and operate the plant and support thousands of direct and indirect US jobs across a nationwide manufacturing supply chain.

Is Centrus an Option for US Involvement in a Saudi Enrichment Program?

It follows, and this is also conjecture, the question is whether it is plausible for US government “deal” with Saudi Arabia for enrichment to involve export of Centrus centrifuges to provision a Saudi enrichment plant with US controls at the helm?

The prospect of American operators and oversight, plus the policy and technical capabilities for a virtual “kill switch,” might convince Congress to approve a 123 Agreement with Saudi Arabia that would be needed to allow Centrus to do business in Saudi Arabia. It is also plausible that the State Department might find other legal authorities to support such an arrangement. For instance, in 2014 the US included authorization of uranium enrichment in the 123 Agreement with Vietnam though that nation so far has not exercised the option.

The Saudi Energy Ministry might even be convinced to make more HALEU and ship some of it back to the US.  DOE’s multi-billion dollar  investments in its Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program, TerraPower and X-Energy,  is facing delays due to the lack of HALEU supplies and needs it from any source outside of Russia.

The US would not have nearly so much influence over Saudi enrichment work if Urenco or Framatome were to lead it.  Also, a US lead role would halt any Saudi aspirations for independence with the nuclear fuel cycle by importing an enrichment plant from Pakistan.

Also, in 2023 the Saudi government signed the additional protocols of the IAEA safeguards agreement mostly to assure delivery of nuclear fuel for an academic research reactor being built for the country by Argentina.

In summary, my thinking is that the only way the US and Saudi Arabia can work on uranium enrichment is if the US is the “custodian” of any enriched product.  As a practical matter, the US doesn’t need low enriched uranium as it has the NM Urenco plant. What the US nuclear industry does need is HALEU for its advanced reactors coming now in development. So, I was thinking, why not have the Saudis make the HALEU, using Centrus centrifuges, ship it to us, and we can trade them for it with conventional fuel when they have commercial reactors ready to burn it.

However, if MBS insists on having complete control of nuclear fuel production, the scenario described here will never happen nor anything like it. His calculus of a path forward depends on how he sees the reality of his circumstances.

Time is Running Out for MBS and the US

In terms of other moving pieces, and from the point of view of conjecture, it might make sense for the Saudi government to select South Korea to build its first two commercial reactors given that country’s success in building four of them for the United Arab Emirates. MBS could not in his most wild dreams expect to award a multi-unit contract award to Russia or China for the reactors and then also expect the US to then provide the defense pact MBS wants to deter aggression from Iran.

As a practical matter, the US military responses to attacks by Iran proxies in the Middle East – Houthi forces in the Red Sea and militia groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria – are de facto a western nation defense pact, spear headed by the US and the UK, that is already in operation even if it isn’t signed and sealed in a formal agreement.  MBS already is getting in these military actions, against Iran’s proxies, the kind of support he might expect from a formal defense pact.

Other interpretations are not so cut and dried. Some might see the US military actions against Iran’s proxies as an effort to blunt Iran’s efforts to embarrass and discourage the West from pursing its efforts to weaken Iran’s drive for regional influence in the Middle East.  This means the US is more interested in thwarting Iran’s indirect military meddling the Middle East by its proxies, which have been a real threat, and not just to support Saudi Arabia, on multiple fronts.

The US effort seen a mixed success in efforts to degrade the Houthi capabilities to disrupt shipping in the region. The Houthi forces have continued their attacks on ships despite the presence of a multi-lateral naval force.

On the other hand, China’s decision to sit out responding to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea should be seen by MBS as a clear signal that even if he buys commercial nuclear reactors from China, he could not expect much help from China regarding future aggression from Iran or its proxies. China is also one of Iran’s biggest customers for fossil fuels which is a significant factor in how it relates in geopolitical terms to events in the region.

This raises a question of whether the US would be likely to proceed to help Saudi Arabia with its commercial nuclear program without any progress on the issue of recognizing Israel or statehood for Palestine?

A lot depends on whether MBS is willing to jettison his prior conditions, relative to Israel and Palestinians, in favor of landing a a defense pact and commercial nuclear power program especially if the Gaza war and Netanyahu’s political blockade on the issue appear to be long term chronic conditions.

Also, it depends on whether the US would see the removal of these linkages as being in its interests for the region. MBS might be a man in a hurry but will the US go along for the ride with him? Surely, with an election looming, would President Biden also be a man in a hurry to secure key aspects of the original Saudi plan? One thing is certain. The US has to put something on the table for the Senate to act on before the end of 2024. What Saudi Arabia wants and what the US can deliver may have effects on Middle East politics for a long time to come.

What Does Saudi Arabia Want from the US for its Reactor Program?

There’s something else. Saudi Arabia’s request for help from the US in June 2023, aside from uranium enrichment, doesn’t necessarily mean it wants Westinghouse AP1000s. What it may really want, ahead of any decision whether to buy the reactors, are two things.

First, it will want to repeat the UAE strategy of hiring former officials of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to help it create and manage a Saudi nuclear safety ministry to insure that the reactors it wants to build are compliant with internationally recognized safety and quality standards and to train the eventual operators of the plant to safely run it without incident.  Second, it will want to hire American construction engineering firms to be in an EPC type role for the project though this may not be exclusive to one firm.

It is plausible to conjecture that Saudi Arabia could be agnostic about buying the Westinghouse reactors from the US so long as it gets US technical assistance in nuclear regulation and construction management, both of which it lacks in terms of mature domestic capabilities.

It is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will not pursue its plans for a commercial nuclear energy program. The original objective, first announced over a decade ago, and reaffirmed since then, is to use nuclear energy replace the burning of valuable oil and gas for domestic consumption, including electricity generation and desalination of sea water for potable uses, to free up these resources for export sales. While the current tender is for two 1400 MWe LWRs, Saudi Arabia’s ambitions are for a fleet of 16 plants spread over three sites. That’s a tall order and will require a lot of expertise to be imported to make it happen.

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